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THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN PERU: 
A BLUEPRINT FOR  
SYSTEMIC REFORM
Korey Finn
Introduction
 A drive through the streets of Lima 
provides a vibrant picture of the informal 
economy in Peru. As you make your way through 
the city center, you witness countless self-
employed street vendors pitching everything 
from hand-made alpaca sweaters to bags filled 
with leaves from the coca plant. Around you 
chaotically whiz micros (medium-sized buses) 
and combis (small vans) whose drivers are 
rarely registered with the city authorities and 
with whom Peruvians advise you ride “at your 
own risk.” As you approach the city limits, the 
landscape reveals rolling hills with seemingly 
every inch covered in small 6-by-3–meter tin 
houses that characterize Lima’s shantytowns. 
The Peruvians here are seldom able to travel 
into the city for income opportunities, 
finding whatever work they can within their 
neighborhoods to provide for themselves and 
their families. One woman described making 
a living by selling milk, bread, and other 
essentials in the neighborhood mini-mart, 
earning less than $2 a day. These Peruvians 
have one thing in common—they operate 
in the pervasive informal economy, which 
disproportionately affects Peruvian workers. 
 In the past two decades, Peru has 
experienced an economic boom which has 
yielded many economic benefits—lower rates 
of poverty, a reduction in unemployment, a 
stabilized currency, low inflation, and increased 
foreign investment. Peru nearly doubled the 
size of its economy from 2002 to 2012 and 
achieved among the highest GDP growth rates 
in the region (FORLAC). However, a majority 
of Peru’s workforce—73 percent—remain in 
the informal economy (CEPLAN). Informal 
activity contributes 19 percent of Peru’s GDP 
(CEPLAN). Under current conditions, Peru’s 
informal sector will employ a significant 
portion of the nation’s labor force—more than 
30 percent—until at least 2050 (CEPLAN), and 
this will have a negative impact on economic 
growth. 
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 The socioeconomic consequences of a 
large informal economy can be significant for a 
developing nation. On a macroeconomic level, 
high levels of informality are associated with 
high levels of poverty, income inequality, and 
social exclusion. From a labor standpoint, jobs 
within the informal sector are often subject 
to poor employment conditions. Because 
these jobs are unregulated, many workers 
lack protection against compulsory overtime, 
layoffs without notice or compensation, and 
unsafe working conditions. They are also 
ineligible for social benefits such as sick pay, 
health insurance, and pensions. There are 7.5 
million Peruvians in the informal economy, and 
therefore 7.5 million individuals who do not 
make social contributions to the government, 
who are not covered by health insurance, 
and who do not receive a host of other public 
services or protection from the government.
 While Peru has an impressive record 
for growth, economic growth alone is an 
insufficient condition for the formalization of 
employment. For Peru to significantly decrease 
the size of its informal economy, it is necessary 
to implement a cohesive package of integrated 
economic, social, and labor policies that 
complement sustainable economic growth. 
Defining Peruvian Informality 
 The informal economy can be defined 
as all unregistered economic activities that 
contribute to GDP and generate unreported 
income through the production of legal 
goods and services. These include primarily 
private businesses and individuals who do not 
possess appropriate documentation and who 
consequently do not pay social contributions 
and do not receive social protection from the 
government. 
 Beneath the umbrella of the informal 
economy exist two distinct concepts: the 
informal sector and informal employment. 
The informal sector is enterprise-based and 
is defined as all people employed in at least 
one informal enterprise. It is measured as the 
percentage of GDP associated with production 
in these enterprises. Informal employment 
is jobs-based, referring to jobs and employed 
persons as individual units. It is measured as 
the percentage of the total labor force employed 
informally. To paint a complete picture of a 
country’s informal economy, it is necessary to 
include both measures. 
 Furthermore, there are two types of 
participants in the informal economy: those 
who participate as a means of survival due to a 
lack of economic alternatives, or “survivalists,” 
and those who participate due to a cost-benefit 
analysis relative to other employment options, 
“entrepreneurial” participants. Entrepreneurial 
participants choose informality as the more 
profitable short-term option. 
 Peru’s informal economy predominantly 
consists of workers with less than a high school 
education, low-income workers, workers under 
30 years old, women, and agricultural workers. 
Eight of ten women who work are employed 
informally. The informal economy employs 95 
percent of workers with less than a high school 
education, 98.8 percent of low-income workers, 
and 97.2 percent of agricultural workers 
(CEPLAN). These groups are the most likely 
to be impoverished and, therefore, should be 
most targeted by social programs. The linkage 
of social benefits to formal employment means 
that the groups most in need of aid and services 
lack access to them. 
 Peru’s rate of informality is among the 
highest in Latin America, surpassed only by 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, all of 
which have significantly lower per capita GDPs. 
Peru’s informal sector GDP of 19 percent is 
above that of neighbors Brazil and Chile (12.3 
percent and 4.8 percent, respectively) as well 
as the Latin American average (13.5 percent) 
(CEPLAN).
 Peru is also not reducing its informal 
employment faster than its neighbors. In 2007, 
80 percent of the labor force was employed 
informally (Thorne); therefore, the current 
situation represents just a seven percentage 
point reduction over seven years. At this rate 
of improvement, the percentage of informal 
laborers in 2050 will remain higher than the 
average percentage in Latin America today.
 In response to the socioeconomic 
obstacles related to informality, Peru’s 
president, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, announced 
his goal of doubling the percentage of the 
labor force employed formally to 60 percent. 
To achieve this, Peru must identify the primary 
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drivers of informal activities and implement 
targeted legislation to reduce this portion of 
the economy. 
Drivers of Informality 
 The informal economy is complex and 
heterogeneous, making it impossible to 
identify a universal definition of its root causes. 
In Peru the informal economy is propelled by 
a combination of drivers, some for survivalists 
and some for entrepreneurial participants. 
Survivalist Participation
 For the survivalist segment, the root of 
the challenge is the inability to accumulate 
human capital. The average number of years of 
education is negatively correlated with the size 
of the informal economy (Bohl et al.). Informal 
activities contribute 19 percent of Peru’s GDP, 
whereas formal education for adults ages 15 
and up averages 8.9 years. In comparison, 
Peru’s neighbor Chile possesses a formal 
education average of 10.1 years and less than 
five percent of its GDP due to informal activities 
(CEPLAN). Peru also consistently ranks among 
the lowest scoring countries on international 
standardized tests, such as the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) test. 
Low test scores and low labor productivity are 
highly correlated (Thorne). Peru is ranked at 
the bottom with the lowest PISA math test 
scores and lowest labor productivity (Figure 1). 
 Improvements to the education sector 
are imperative to increase the productivity and 
earning power of citizens. Policies promoting 
investment in human capital, such as reducing 
the cost of education and providing financial 
security in mitigating external fiscal shocks 
to a household with limited funds set aside 
for education, aim to break the feedback loop 
of informality with poverty and low labor 
productivity. In the long run, the development 
of human capital, such as education, can also 
be a leverage point for societies to improve 
global competitiveness.
Entrepreneurial Participation 
 For entrepreneurial participants, drivers 
of informality include forces that act as barriers 
for participants to join the formal sector (to 
“push” them out of the formal sector) and 
forces that incentivize participants to formalize 
(to “pull” them into the formal sector). 
 Among the push factors are government 
regulation, taxation, and corruption. The most 
significant of these is government regulation. 
In Peru, business and labor are more highly 
regulated than in most countries of the 
developed world. Peru is ranked 133rd of 140 
countries with respect to the flexibility of 
companies to hire and fire workers (Schwab). 
Peruvian workers are entitled to 30 days of 
vacation per year, two annual bonuses equal 
to one month’s salary, health insurance, 
life insurance, and a stipend for those with 
children. Peruvian law forbids layoffs, and 
workers can only be fired for specified legal 
reasons. Workers deemed fired arbitrarily are 
entitled to up to one-and-a-half year’s salary in 
severance (World Bank). 
 In 2016, Peru ranked 50th of 189 
countries for its cost of doing business (World 
Bank). The ranking fell five places from 2015, 
an unfavorable trend. The same study ranked 
Peru 97th for ease of starting a business. This 
ranking considers such factors as the average 
number of procedures required as well as the 
median number of days necessary to register 
a firm, the fees associated with registration, 
and the minimum paid-in capital required of 
the prospective business owner. Registering a 
new firm takes an average of 26 days, compared 
with 8.3 days in Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
It takes business owners more than three times 
as long to register firms in Peru as those in 
developed countries. Moreover, Peru’s ranking 
fell seven places from 2015. 
 A team of economists conducted an 
experiment to illustrate the difficulties of 
starting a business in Peru. They set out to open 
a small garment shop in Lima’s outskirts (de 
Soto, p. 18). The team completed the required 
paperwork, waited in queues, and made many 
bus trips into central Lima to get the necessary 
certifications. Dedicating six hours a day, the 
team finally registered the business 289 days 
later. This is not an uncommon situation for 
low-income Peruvians attempting to open small 
businesses. For those without the funds or the 
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ability to navigate the bureaucratic red tape, 
operating without the proper documentation 
is an attractive alternative. 
 In addition to regulations, Peru’s 
corporate taxation is an important push factor. 
According to Bohl and colleagues, the total share 
of taxed profits and mandatory contributions 
from a firm is positively correlated with the 
size of the informal sector. Put simply, higher 
tax rates yield larger informal economies. 
Firms overburdened by taxes and mandatory 
payments may evade them by staying informal, 
thus raising net earnings. Participants face a 
simple cost-benefit dilemma, made all the 
easier to address as the tax burden increases. 
 In the World Bank “Doing Business 2016” 
study, Peru ranked 50th in ease of paying taxes, 
where a lower ranking corresponds to a lower 
overall tax burden (which includes the taxes 
and other contributions a medium-sized firm 
must pay or withhold each year as well as the 
administrative burden of paying these taxes). 
Peru’s total tax burden of 35.9 percent of 
profits is smaller than the 41.2 percent average 
in developed countries (World Bank). However, 
when factoring in the time to prepare, file, 
and pay all taxes and social contributions, 
Peruvian firms on average spend 260 hours 
per year compared to the 176.6-hour average 
in developed countries (World Bank). This 
difference is due to the complicated tax filing 
process, driven by complex legislative policies 
and strict government regulation. Moreover, 
according to research by Peru’s Ministry of 
Labor, current tax regimes undermine business 
growth and reduce net profits by 12 percent to 
50 percent and ultimately serve to raise the 
rate of tax evasion. Of Peru’s value-added tax 
(VAT), 31 percent of the potential revenue is 
evaded, compared with 24 percent in Mexico, 
23 percent in Colombia, 22 percent in Chile, 
and just 13 percent in Uruguay (Thorne).
 The final constraint to formalization 
is government corruption. A high level of 
corruption is indicative of a higher tolerance 
among officials for unreported economic 
activity. Although measuring corruption is 
difficult, many analyses use public perceptions 
of corruptness as a gauge. The Transparency 
International “Corruption Perception Index 
2016” assigns Peru a score of 35/100 in 
corruptness, with 100 indicating least corrupt. 
Peru placed 101st of 176 countries in perception 
of corruptness, whereas neighbors Chile and 
Uruguay placed 24th and 21st, respectively. 
Corruption is effectively an indirect tax that 
entrepreneurs pay to avoid regulatory burdens. 
In an environment with high corruption, an 
entrepreneur in a legitimate line of work may 
still feel the need to keep extra cash off the books 
to pay officials who demand bribes. Therefore, 
firms facing high levels of corruption tend 
to see the costs of formality outweighing the 
benefits.
 Participants and firms must consider the 
potential benefits received by engaging with 
state rules. Pull factors, which are inversely 
related to the size of informal economies, 
include government spending on research 
and development, government transfers to 
households, and government effectiveness. 
Research and development expenditures 
strengthen firms and make them more 
competitive. Government transfers include 
social programs and safety nets, such as state 
pension funds and welfare. Linking these 
benefits to the formal economy provides strong 
incentives to operate in the formal sector. 
Evidence suggests that the effectiveness of 
government in dispersing these incentives is 
critical to whether the incentives pull people 
into the formal sector. 
Tackling Informality  
with Legislative Reform
Institutional Change  
with Limited Success
 The Peruvian government has attempted 
to mitigate the socioeconomic challenges 
caused by the informal sector through 
legislative policies. But these policies have 
achieved only limited success. As discussed 
previously, informal employment decreased 
by only seven percentage points from 2005 
to 2012 (Thorne). And this reduction was 
achieved in the context of several positive 
external factors, notably a favorable economic 
cycle that expanded the job market. 
 One institutional change was the 2007 
implementation of the e-payroll system. 
Businesses with three or more employees were 
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mandated to report specific tax information to 
the nation’s tax authority, SUNAT (FORLAC). 
The implementation of this system made it 
easier to monitor and enforce tax and labor 
obligations and contributed to the registration 
of 340,000 jobs, an estimated 276,000 of which 
are new formalized jobs (FORLAC). 
 Peru has also recognized the need 
for regulation to specifically encourage 
the formalization of micro and small 
enterprises (MSEs), because MSEs experience 
disproportionately high informality. Tax 
regimes were simplified for MSEs through the 
Single Simplified Regime, which allows small 
businesses to pay a monthly fixed sum in lieu of 
filing tax returns. These enterprises generally 
avoid paying income, sales, and municipal taxes 
(FORLAC). Additionally, the Special Income 
Tax Regime for MSEs permits the payment of 
the monthly sum based on net income at a rate 
considerably lower than the corporate rate of 30 
percent (FORLAC). The goal of these programs 
is to decrease the tax burden on MSEs, thereby 
reducing a key barrier to formalization, as well 
as to ultimately expand the tax base. Despite 
these well-intended policies, there has not 
been a significant reduction in informality. In 
2011, only five percent of MSEs in Peru were 
formally registered (FORLAC). 
Shortcomings of Peru’s  
Current Approach
 In 2016, Peru’s finance minister, Alfredo 
Thorne, presented an ambitious plan to 
reduce the informal economy, targeting a 
reduction to 30 percent of the labor force by 
Figure 1
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2021. Thorne’s strategy involves three reform 
pillars: reduction of barriers to formalization, 
improvement of quality and access to public 
services, and creation of pro-formalization 
regulatory policy. Although the plan includes 
many sound, comprehensive policies, there are 
some crucial areas in which it falls short. 
 To address the reduction of barriers 
to formalization, Thorne identified tax and 
administrative simplification, higher-quality 
protection for workers, and improved credit 
access as important policy objectives. Tax 
simplification policies would propose new 
tax schemes to provide greater incentives for 
formalization. President Kuczynski announced 
in September 2016 his plan to reduce the 
national sales tax (VAT) from 18 percent to 17 
percent (Post, “Peru Govt...”) to attract informal 
businesses to register with the state. To offset 
the lost revenue, Kuczynski proposed raising 
Peru’s corporate tax rate. However, although 
reducing the VAT may decrease barriers to 
registration, a corporate tax rate increase 
would have the opposite effect. An increase in 
the corporate tax rate may shrink the tax base, 
because more firms find it costlier to remain 
formal and therefore opt out of paying taxes 
altogether. In other countries, a reduction in 
the corporate tax rate has been shown to expand 
the tax base. Portugal reformed its tax structure 
in 2014 to decrease the corporate tax rate from 
25 percent to 19 percent and reintroduced 
a simplified corporate tax reporting system 
for MSEs (Loureiro and Cunningham). This 
policy increased the overall tax base—of the 
€37 billion tax revenue in 2014, €754 million 
was associated with the anti-evasion program 
(Loureiro and Cunningham). And Portugal 
also became more attractive for doing business, 
rising from 51st to 36th from 2014 to 2015 
(World Bank). 
 Many aspects of Thorne’s plan attempt to 
incentivize workers to join the formal sector. In 
the framework of improved quality and access 
to public services, Thorne proposes expanding 
the coverage of health services and improving 
the quality of education to increase human 
capital. 
 The final pillar of Thorne’s plan involves 
the implementation of pro-formalization 
regulatory policy. He proposes creating a 
National Council for Competitiveness and 
Formalization to identify changes in policy to 
encourage formalization. These reforms may 
include business training, strengthening of 
institutions, improvement in the rule of law, 
and greater access to credit. Many MSEs face 
a limited and expensive supply of credit, with 
interest rates usually between 20 percent and 
33 percent. Providing greater access to lower 
cost funding will incentivize formalization. 
 Many of Thorne’s policy approaches are 
similar to what other countries in the region 
have effectively adopted. However, Thorne’s 
plan does not address loosening Peru’s 
stringent labor regulations, a significant barrier 
to formalization. Lima Chamber of Commerce 
lawyer Victor Zavala summarized Peru’s most 
urgent problem: “Today it is easier to close 
a business than to fire an employee” (Post, 
“Peru’s Formalization…”). If Peru expects to 
significantly reduce its informal sector, the 
government must reduce labor regulations. 
An Integrated Policy Approach
 Many of the policies implemented over 
the past decade have failed to significantly 
tackle the problem of informality. This may 
be because the reforms were not cohesive but 
instead were designed to address disparate 
issues, which made for an ineffective overall 
impact. The solution, and what has proved 
successful for many other countries, is a 
heterogeneous approach to legislative reform. 
Peru must employ a package of integrated, 
comprehensive changes to achieve two goals: 
(1) decrease barriers to formalization for 
informal workers and enterprises and (2) 
provide appropriate incentives to attract 
individuals and firms to the formal sector. 
These two goals can be thought of as reducing 
the push factors and increasing the pull factors 
of formalization. 
 As discussed previously, a primary push 
factor is Peru’s corporate tax policy. Many 
small firms lack the resources to prepare, file, 
and pay all taxes and mandatory government 
contributions. For this reason, many countries 
have benefitted from taxation reform for MSEs, 
which, by decreasing the amount they pay in 
government contributions, reduces the barrier 
to these enterprises to formalize. Such reforms 
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have included measures to both reduce the 
tax burden for compliers and to encourage 
compliance. For Peru, the former objective 
can be achieved by reducing the corporate 
income tax, providing tax concessions in 
industries with a high percentage of informal 
workers, and introducing tax reductions for 
low-wage earners. To encourage compliance, 
policies should simplify the tax structure for 
SMEs and eliminate overlapping payroll taxes, 
making it easier to file and pay (Oviedo). The 
goal of this reform is to collect more of the 
lost government revenues due to tax evasion. 
This would increase government revenues, 
thereby decreasing fiscal borrowing, reducing 
budget deficits, and lowering inflation 
rates. Additionally, with the potential for 
consequently greater spending on public 
welfare programs, such tax reforms would 
help shrink income inequality (Wedderburn). 
For firms, compliance with tax policies could 
make it easier to obtain financing to grow 
their businesses. Because firms are required 
to maintain proper accounting records, they 
will be able to demonstrate collateral and the 
ability to repay debt, allowing them to obtain 
loans (Wedderburn). 
 Tax reform alone, however, is insufficient 
to reduce the number of informal firms; the 
tax administration must also address efficiency 
and enforcement issues. This is because a 
tax regime that is unequally enforced—for 
example, one that offers tax deductions to 
large corporations in exchange for political 
support—will continue to perpetuate income 
inequality and push smaller enterprises 
towards informality. 
 Peru’s neighbor to the east offers an 
example of successful tax reform. In 1997 
Brazil implemented the Integrated System 
of Taxes and Contributions for Micro and 
Small Enterprises, which replaced six types of 
federal taxes and five types of social security 
contributions with a progressive tax levied on 
gross revenues. This program linked social 
security contributions to a firm’s revenue as 
opposed to the number of workers employed; 
consequently, it reduced the cost of hiring 
another worker, thus eliminating the incentive 
to employ informally (Oviedo). Because of 
this program, Brazil achieved a rise in the 
registration rate of firms of between 10 percent 
and 30 percent (de Paula and Scheinkman). 
 Legislative policies to decrease barriers to 
formal entry should also address onerous labor 
regulations. In 2015, the World Bank offered 
recommendations for Peru to increase its 
productivity and to sustain economic growth. 
Its report identified the informal economy 
as a key barrier to sustained growth and 
recommended that Peru, most importantly, 
should loosen labor regulations. World Bank 
official John Panzer summarized the main 
finding of the report: “[More flexibility for 
employers] will compel the informal sector 
to join the formal sector, because it allows 
greater access to credit, resources and support 
from the state” (Post, “World Bank...”). He also 
emphasizes that “the restrictive laws in regard 
to firing workers prevent employers from hiring 
new employees. As a result, this promotes 
informality and reduces productivity” (Post, 
“World Bank...”). 
 Peru may find that the best place to start 
to lessen the burden of regulation would be to 
enable employers to hire and fire workers more 
easily. To create flexibility in hiring and firing, 
Peru could begin by eliminating policies that 
forbid layoffs and by broadening the definition 
of “just cause” for dismissal. It should, in 
particular, clear the way for firms to adjust their 
workforces during varying economic cycles 
and to encourage part-time and temporary 
contracts for unemployed workers (Oviedo).
 Addressing tax policy and labor regulation 
will alleviate some of the costs of formalizing, 
but additional measures must be taken. One 
barrier to formalization is the difficulty with 
which a small business can register with the 
state. For de Soto’s team of economists, a 
major barrier to registration was the lack of 
transportation between Lima’s slums, where 
their business was located, and the city, where 
the registration centers were located. Peru could 
ease this burden by establishing registration 
offices in many central neighborhoods. The 
Ministry of Labor could also position officials 
in those areas to directly provide legalization 
assistance and facilitate the arduous process of 
registering with the state. 
 Many countries, including Mexico and 
Colombia, have expedited the formalization 
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process by introducing a one-stop shop for 
business registration. In Mexico, the Fast-track 
Business Creation System guarantees that 
MSEs can complete the registration process 
in two days and has reduced the number 
of procedures from eight to two (Oviedo). 
Estimates are that this policy doubled the 
number of new firm registrations from four 
percent to eight percent (Kaplan et al.).
 Additionally, the Peruvian government 
should consider providing regularization 
loans to small businesses as an incentive to 
formalize. Many MSEs struggle because of 
limited access to capital, and formalizing their 
business may eat into already limited profits. 
Offering expanded and cheaper credit to firms 
who can prove 100 percent formal workforce 
participation will allow these firms to access 
the capital that they desperately need to grow 
their businesses (Porembka). 
 Finally, strong social programs are 
often the carrot that incentivizes informal 
participants to opt into the government’s rule 
of law. They also help redistribute income 
to the poorest members of society and thus 
reduce income inequality. Brazil experienced 
success with its Bolsa Familia program, 
which unified municipal, state, and federal 
government income programs and became the 
largest wealth-transfer and poverty-fighting 
program in the country (Domingues Junior). 
The program fought social inequality, while at 
the same time empowered families by enabling 
them to leave informal work conditions 
(Domingues Junior). Because of this and 
many other integrated policy reforms, such 
as the tax reform policy discussed previously, 
from 2002 to 2013 informal employment in 
Brazil decreased by 19 percentage points to 37 
percent, while the informal economy fell from 
40 percent of GDP in 2002 to just 12.3 percent 
(CEPLAN).
 Peru can incentivize labor force 
participation by providing training to small-
scale entrepreneurs on the technical skills 
needed for success. Peru could also address 
gender inequality in informal participation by 
providing gender-specific training for women. 
Sri Lanka was successful in implementing 
a similar strategy by initiating a training 
program that enabled informal workers to 
obtain technical skills through both private 
and public training institutions (Flodman 
Becker). Chile went even further, levying 
fines on informal sector business owners for 
noncompliance with training. 
 International experience suggests that 
when a government makes informality a top 
priority and tackles it with broad and integrated 
reform, significant advances can be quickly 
achieved. Spain offers a useful example of 
such comprehensive reform. It implemented a 
package of reforms aimed at reducing the costs 
of being formal, improving audit technology, 
and increasing enforcement to fight tax evasion. 
It modernized administrative processes and 
provided more extensive and efficient social 
protection (Oviedo). Among the reforms in 
this package were the simplification of the 
tariff system, the introduction of legislation 
allowing for temporary employment, and the 
reduction of social security contributions for 
part-time employees. Also included were social 
policies designed to de-link certain benefits 
from labor contracts, such as moving from a 
social insurance system financed by payroll 
taxes to a universal healthcare system financed 
by general taxation (Oviedo). 
The Year 2050:  
An Economic Snapshot
 If Peru does not reduce its informal 
economy, the informal sector could potentially 
be a major drag on the country’s economic 
future. A study by CEPLAN1 assessed the impact 
that the informal sector can have on such key 
economic variables as GDP, unemployment, 
and average income. The study explored several 
scenarios, including a most optimistic scenario 
in which Peru succeeds in reducing the size of 
its informal economy to one percent of GDP 
and a pessimistic scenario that continues 
current trends (CEPLAN).
 The baseline scenario examined what 
would happen to the size of the informal 
economy if Peru continues to reduce its 
informal economy at the present rate. By the 
 1CEPLAN is Peru’s National Center for Strategic 
Planning and seeks to improve the quality of life of the 
population and contribute to the sustainable development 
of the country. 
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Figure 2
Impact of Reducing Informal Sector GDP in 2050
(a) GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) (b) Government Revenues (% of GDP)                                                  
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year 2030, informal activities would comprise 
13.8 percent of GDP, which would still be higher 
than the current 13.5 percent Latin American 
average. By 2050, Peru would be among the 
region’s top two countries with the highest 
informal sector, at six percent of GDP, with 
only Colombia coming in worse (CEPLAN). 
Informal employment in Peru would be about 
50 percent in 2030 and 30 percent in 2050. 
Compared with current figures for countries, 
such as Mexico (54.3 percent), Argentina (49.7 
percent), Brazil (42.2 percent), and Chile (32.3 
percent), Peru’s informal economy in 2050 
would only be slightly smaller as a percentage 
of the workforce than that in Chile today. 
Additionally, it would still have the highest 
rate of workforce informality in the region 
(CEPLAN).
 The CEPLAN study quantified various 
scenarios to examine the impact that a 
reduction in the informal sector would have 
on overall GDP growth, government revenues, 
poverty, and informal employment. Figure 2 
illustrates the change in these four variables 
by 2050 in three cases: if informal GDP stands 
at the predicted six percent; if it is reduced 
to three percent; and the most optimistic 
case in which it is reduced to one percent. In 
each reduction case, there is a positive impact 
on all four major economic variables. GDP 
growth is increased by almost a full percentage 
point, government revenue is increased by 13 
percent, poverty is reduced by more than 2 
million people, and informal employment is 
reduced by 12 percent (CEPLAN). 
 A persistent and sizeable informal 
economy in 2050 is not desirable for Peru’s 
continued economic growth. If left unaddressed, 
it will restrict economic development, shrink 
government revenues leading to higher deficits 
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and less funding for social programs, and leave 
millions of people unemployed and millions 
more employed but in poverty.
Conclusion
 The pervasiveness of the informal 
economy in Peru requires immediate action 
to mitigate the harmful effects it will have 
on Peru’s economic future. Reduction in 
GDP growth, loss of tax revenue, and reduced 
national productivity can severely impede 
a growing nation. Peru must address its 
informal economy with integrated social 
and labor reforms, to both reduce barriers 
to formalization and incentivize workers to 
participate formally. By doing this, Peru not 
only will grow its economy but also reduce 
income inequality, accumulate human capital, 
and improve the lives of millions of its citizens. 
The self-employed street venders who spot the 
streets of downtown Lima will be able to easily 
register their businesses, gain easier access 
to capital, and expand their enterprises. The 
neighborhood mini-mart owner in the Lima 
shantytown will finally have access to adequate 
housing, healthcare, and education for her 
children. To improve the lives of millions of 
citizens, Peru needs to integrate its people into 
the formal labor market, thereby investing in 
the continued success of its economic future. 
65
Bohl, David, Barry Hughes, Mohammod Irfan, Eli 
Margolese-Malin, and José Solórzano. “Procurement 
of Consulting Services for Implementation of a 
Prospective Module about the Informal Economy in 
the IFs Model, in Order to Adapt It to the Case of 
Peru.” Frederick S. Pardee Center for International 
Futures. April 2015.
CEPLAN. “The Informal Economy in Peru: Current 
Situation and Perspectives,” 1st ed. Lima, Peru. 
March 2016. 
de Paula, Aureo, and José Scheinkman. “The Informal 
Sector.” Working Paper 13486. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, October 2007. www.nber.org/papers/
w13486.pdf. Accessed October 24, 2016. 
de Soto, Hernando. The Mystery of Capital. Great Britain: 
Bantam Press, 2000.
Domingues Junior, Paulo Lourenço. “Formal and Informal 
Markets and Public Policies in Brazil.” European 
Journal of Business and Social Sciences. Vol. 5, 
No. 6, 2016, pp. 1–16. www.ejbss.com/Data/Sites/1/
vol5no06september2016/ejbss-1779-16-formalan
dinformalmarketsandpublicpoliciesinbrazil.pdf. 
Accessed October 24, 2016. 
Flodman Becker, Kristina. “The Informal Economy.” 
Stockholm, Sweden: Sida (Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency), March 2004. 
FORLAC: Programme for the Promotion of Formalization 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. “Trends 
in Informal Employment in Peru: 2004–2012.” 
International Labour Organization. 2014. www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/
documents/publication/wcms_245891.pdf. Accessed 
November 16, 2016. 
Kaplan, David S., Eduardo Piedra, and Enrique Seira. 
“Entry Regulation and Business Start-ups: Evidence 
from Mexico.” Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 95, 
No. 11–12, 2011, pp. 1501–15. doi.org/10.1016/j.
jpubeco.2011.03.007. Accessed November 5, 2016. 
Loureiro, Carlos, and William Cunningham. “Portugal’s 
Corporate Tax Reforms Offer Chance to Expand the 
Base While Making Rate Cuts.” Financial Times. 
December 4, 2014. www.ft.com/content/dbf504d0-
7198-11e4-b178-00144feabdc0. Accessed November 
5, 2016.
Oviedo, Ana-Maria. “Economic Informality: Causes, Costs, 
and Policies, A Literature Survey of International 
Experience.” Background Paper prepared for Turkey 
– Country Economic Memorandum – Informality: 
Causes, Consequences, Policies. World Bank. June 2009. 
Porembka, Anna. “Argentina’s Informal Economy: A Case 
Study of Patria Grande upon the Informal Textile 
Industry.” Master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 
2013.
Post, Colin. “Peru Govt Prepares for Fight with Congress 
over Tax Cut.” Peru Reports. September 1, 2016. 
perureports.com/2016/09/01/peru-govt-prepares-for-
fight-with-congress-over-tax-cut/. Accessed October 
15, 2016. 
Post, Colin. “Peru’s Formalization Plan Does Not Touch 
Labor Regulation.” Peru Reports. August 25, 2016. 
perureports.com/2016/08/25/perus-formalization-
plan-not-include-labor-flexibility/. Accessed August 
30, 2016. 
Post, Colin. “World Bank Recommends Peru Loosen Labor 
Regulation.” Peru Reports. October 8, 2015. perureports.
com/2015/10/08/world-bank-recommends-peru- 
loosen-labor-regulation/. Accessed August 30, 2016. 
Schwab, Klaus. “The Global Competitiveness Report 2015–
2016.” No. 92-95044-99-1. Geneva, Switzerland: 
World Economic Forum, 2015. 
Thorne, Alfredo. “Peru: Economy and Formalization.” 
Address presented at CONFIEP: Diálogos para el 
Desarrollo, August 23, 2016. www.mef.gob.pe/
contenidos/inversionistas/presentacion_economia_
formalizacion_23082016.pdf. Accessed November 
12, 2016. 
Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions Index 
2016.” Berlin, Germany: Transparency International, 
January 25, 2017. www.transparency.org/news/ 
feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016. 
Accessed April 30, 2017. 
Wedderburn, Chantal. “The Impact of the Informal 
Economy on GDP Growth in Latin America and 
the Caribbean.” Master’s thesis, Florida Atlantic 
University, 2009. 
World Bank. “Doing Business 2016: Measuring Regulatory 
Quality and Efficiency,” 13th ed. DOI: 10.1596/978-
1-4648-0667-4. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Group, 2016.
REFERENCES2
 2Reference titles originally in Spanish have been 
translated to English by the author.
